If the Jewish tree is the pine, the Palestinian tree is the olive (see, e.g., Figures 1 & 2) . As
Ismat Shbeta, a refugee from the depopulated Palestinian village Miske, tells me in an interview, "The olive is the Palestinian tree…. That's the olive's nationality" (Interview, Tel Aviv, August 10, 2006) . The olive and the pine seem to be perfect opposites, agronomically as well as culturally. Elsewhere, I have explored in depth both the pine's construction as the Zionist tree and the bifurcated relation between the pine and the olive, along with the range of contestations to this naturalized bifurcation (2009, in press.a, in press.b).
This article's focus is on the olive tree. Again, this is but one side of the much larger into the land has, in other words, been flipped on its head and has morphed into yet another means for Israel's assertion of occupation and control in this place.
Generally, this article is situated within the literature of Law and Geography, which focuses on an exploration of the intricate connections between law and space (see, e.g., Blomley 1994; Blomley et. al 2001; Delaney 1998) . My study offers a more material focus within this literature. It highlights both the physical and the imaginary spatialities of olive trees. It also demonstrates how the identity of these trees and the establishment of their meaning have manifested and changed through a set of government policies, court decisions, and military regulations. The article begins by describing the significance of the olive for the Palestinian, which ranges between its identity as a shajara fakir (pauper's tree) and its identity as a shajara mubaraka (holy tree). This part of the article focuses on the Palestinian act of "rooting,"
and even clinging, to the land, performed through the olive tree. Thus the olive here not merely stands for but also embodies the Palestinian. Next, the article focuses on the olive's "uprooting." Specifically, it explores two instances of olive uprooting: the State of Israel's massive uprooting of olive orchards in order to make way for the Separation Barrier and the publicly contested uprooting and sabotaging of olive trees by certain Jewish settlers. In both instances, the olive's erasure from the landscape is perceived as necessary to make space for an alternative and exclusive Jewish presence. Parallel to the olive's direct obstruction through uprooting, the final section of the article identifies another, much less direct, form of control of the Palestinian's relationship with the olive--this time through Israel's enactment of a diffuse regulatory network of "friction zones"
and "timetables."
The article is based on a series of semi-structured, in-depth interviews and also on participant observation with the following: Palestinian fellahin (Arabic for farmers; see also [Zionists have] a certain fixation that the Palestinians have only a very superficial relationship with their land: they come only once a year and then leave. This blends in well with the stereotype of the lazy Arab that sits under the tree all day: the goats come to him and give him their milk, and the olives, when they don't fall on his head, he might need to shake the tree lightly so that they fall in his lap…. You see this in the Zionist discourse for over a hundred years: Like the roots of the olive tree.
[As'ad al-As'ad, in Ashrawi 1978: 91] Lightning, thunder, prayer 1966. Not realizing that the Israeli army had changed the curfew by several hours, the workers returned home from work outside the village and were all shot and killed on sight. The poem is written from the perspective of one of the dead men, whose wedding was to take place several days later. In the poem he addresses his bride:
The olive grove was once green, At least it used to be…and the sky was a blue forest…at least it used to be, my love
What changed it that evening?
The olive grove was always green.
At least it used to be, my love.
Fifty victims, at sundown
Turned it into a red pool…fifty victims.
[Mahmoud Darwish, in Bardenstein 1999: 153-154] Of the large body of Palestinian poetry that uses the olive tree as a symbol of the Palestinian struggle, these four poems illustrate the idea of the olive tree as a living 157; Slyomovics 1998).
A fusion of humans and trees is thereby constructed: the olive embodies the Palestinian people, the green of its foliage is perceived as interchangeable with the red of their blood.
However, the olive is not only a proxy witness (Bardenstein 1999: 156) ; it also provides a model of survival for the Palestinian people. In this sense, the olive not only stands for but also speaks for the mute and uprooted Palestinian (contrary to the more usual case whereby humans speak for things; see, e.g., Callon 1986). Olive Uprooting: The Wall against the Olive
Up until now I have explored the powerful meanings of olive uprooting to Palestinians and its significance in the project of resisting the Israeli occupation, which is also heavily focused on territory and land (Weizman 2007) . Now, I would like to explore Israel's project of uprooting this same tree, an act that can only be understood in light of the previous discussion.
Since its inception, and increasingly in the last two decades, Israel has been uprooting Palestinian olive trees. The use of tree uprooting as a punitive measure predates the establishment of the State of Israel; it was used by Ottoman rulers against the fellahin as punishment for tax avoidance and was later implemented by the British Mandatory administration in Palestine through its emergency regulations (Cohen 1993; Bardenstein 1998: 10) . However, Israel's central rationale for uprooting olive trees in the occupied territories has not been framed as punitive, or at least not explicitly so. Israel explains these uprootings, rather, as essential for its national security. First, Israel has been uprooting olives to make way for the recently built Separation Barrier. In the same vein, Israel's Defense Forces have uprooted thousands of olive and other fruit trees, and continues to do so, to secure roads, increase visibility, and make way for watchtowers, checkpoints, additional roads, and security fences around Jewish settlements (see, e.g., Although the uprooting of olive trees to facilitate the construction of the Separation
Barrier initially caused some unease among the Israeli public, soon the security rationale supporting the barrier prevailed. However, under international pressure, the Israeli government assured that it would re-plant all uprooted olives. Suliman Shahin, the Palestinian attorney discussed above, addresses the assumption behind this re-planting:
[Since] it's a tree, they depict it as something that can be transplanted, which makes it seem like no fundamental harm was done. Do you understand? They say that the root of the tree is not necessarily connected to this place but could instead be rooted anywhere else; they even say that we can benefit from it. During a break in the court hearing I briefly spoke to one of the girls, who was fourteen years of age at the time. When I asked her why she damaged the trees, the girl replied confidently, "I have nothing against the trees; this is about the land -it's our land, not theirs." The girls' defense attorney, whom I interviewed separately both before and after the court hearing, further suggested that the girls "are fair enough to give [the Palestinians] a sort of early warning that now we are harming your trees, but next time we will harm you." Conflating humans and trees, the girls' lawyer presented the uprooting of trees as a humane act, an act that spares humans from the harsh treatment that is, instead, inflicted on trees. The lawyer concluded the interview by asking me rhetorically, "What do you think is more important, people or trees?"
Rabbi Arik Ascherman, executive director of Rabbis for Human Rights, interprets the settlers' act of uprooting very differently. Namely, he notes the conflation between humans and the arboreal and the use of this conflation as a legitimizing factor for damaging Palestinian trees. Rabbi Ascherman also tells me that many Jewish settlers oppose the damaging of Palestinian trees. However, this opposition is usually based on the sacredness of trees in Jewish tradition, rather than on the harm inflicted on the Palestinian people. Indeed, secretary of Jewish settlement Maon, which is located in the southern West Bank, has harshly condemned the uprooting of olive trees. "As settlers and farmers," a news statement quotes him saying, "our way is not to destroy and uproot, but to build and plant" (Ha'aretz 2006b) . Similarly, when replying to online questions on a Jewish Orthodox website, Rabbi Zalman Melamed, the former head of Yesha Council of Rabbis (the prominent settler organization), stresses that cutting olive trees is prohibited by Jewish law, "unless the trees serve as hiding places for terrorists, and in that case they should be cut down for security reasons" (Ha'aretz 2006b ).
The reports about Jews harming olive trees elicited much shock among Jewish communities around the globe. In an interview, a Toronto board member of the local chapter of JNF explains some of the underlying reasons for his shocked response. "What I am going to say is inhumane," he warns me in advance, and then he proceeds to illustrate in gory detail how he would "gladly" carpet-bomb a large crowd of "Arabs" And here, a different type of response to the olive uprooting phenomenon:
We must look severely upon the attacks on olive harvesters. For Palestinian farmers, the olive harvest is a festival and a cultural event that goes beyond the purely economic dimension. In the future, all necessary steps will be taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. [Sharon, B'Tselem 2002: 19] In contrast, international human rights activists seem less concerned by the physical and economic damage caused by the uprootings and more by the emotional and symbolic damages of these acts. In the words of human rights activist Christy Bischoff, "As we approached the woman sitting by the 102 olive trees that the settlers cut the night before, I saw the tears rolling down [her] face as she stared ahead. We were coming to pay our respects; it was a funeral, a graveyard where the 30-year-old trees were slaughtered" (see Nidal asked for three hundred olive trees to replace the uprooted ones, to which Ascherman replied by promising that he will get the new trees there by Sunday, "rain or shine." However, he qualified, "I will donate these trees with one condition: that they don't just serve farmers from the village, but that they are planted either in the areas that are nearest to the settlements or in the [exact] location from which the trees were uprooted, and not just anywhere." This conforms with the mission of the organization, which is not environmental, as Ascherman clarified above, but rather focused on the unjust appropriation of Palestinian land. The olive trees, yet again, are fought over not for their own sake but for what they have come to represent and embody.
In a later conversation conducted that same day, Rabbi Ascherman and two other heads of Village Councils negotiated the number of trees that Rabbis for Human Rights would provide for that particular season. During the conversation, the head of the Village
Council of Salem, where two thousand olive trees had been uprooted around that time, revealed that he had already secured one thousand trees from two different sources. In response, Ascherman clarified that "there is a long list of villages waiting for our trees; so if you have trees from another source, I can give mine to other villages." Evidently, even the project of replanting olive trees involves multiple negotiations. Next, Ascherman spoke with the head of Yanun's Village Council, who refused to take any of Ascherman's trees. When he noticed my surprise at this, Ascherman explained, "Since their village is near a very intense conflict zone they are not sure whether or not they will be able to cultivate the land. They don't want to plant trees and then not be able to take care of them." Here, then, the trees themselves again assume importance and not merely as tools for grabbing land.
Another sensitive topic on the issue of trees has been the geographic source of these trees. Rabbi Ascherman also provides a small but illustrative example of one possible meaning of local time in this context. When he asks the head of Burin's Village Council by which date the latter would like to have the trees ready for planting, the village head replies, "After the big rain," a schedule which the Rabbi contrasts with the military's approach:
The Samaria branch of Israel's Defense Forces has come up with a timetable scheme, which means that they take responsibility for protecting the harvesters, but only when the harvesters comply with certain time requirements: for example, this and this village has [to harvest] from this date to this date. [The military timetable] is mostly arbitrary: they make it seem as if their timetable is coordinated with the Palestinians, but in fact that doesn't happen. [Interview, Jerusalem, December 15, 2005] Similarly, E.P. Thompson (1967) notes the modern transformation from agricultural time, structured by seasons and associated with varied tasks, to "clock time," which organizes the working hours of industry to extract maximum surplus value from the workers. In this case, Israel has introduced into the occupied West Bank a new system of timetables (luzim) that impose a rigid allocation of harvest days. You're a farmer, and you want to go and cultivate your land, but now you have to work through these overwhelming bureaucratic structures just to go on living your daily life…. We're talking about an entire bureaucratic structure that has developed as a response [to the olive uprooting by the settlers]. [Interview, Jerusalem, December 20, 2005] Yehouda adds that the court decision "totally changed people's lives over there. It changed the nature of everyday life in the village" (emphasis added). Instead of introducing stability and order, Israel's bureaucratic apparatus has evoked much chaos and misunderstanding, Yehouda says. " [Y] ou just can't administer hundreds, or even thousands, of farmers that, for the most part, don't want to be administered," she concludes.
Conclusion
This article explored the legal geography -namely the interrelations between the legalities and spatialities -of the olive tree. It did so, mainly, by discussing the olive's physical, imaginary, and regulatory dimensions. In particular, the article showed that the olive's importance in the national Palestinian scheme, although definitely a result of economic interests and historic tradition, is at the same time also given greater emphasis by Israel's deadly targeting of the olive tree as a symbolic and physical embodiment of Palestinian national resistance. Simultaneously, the spatial and temporal regulation of However, they would probably also see clearly the connection between the trees and the overall power struggle over land, autonomy, identity, and power at stake. Conducting the war over land through tree warfare -rather than simply taking over the land with the force of guns and bulldozers, for example -has helped to fix and naturalize the importance of trees in Israel/Palestine as well as to underscore the dramatic and central role that land still performs in this region.
Notes
7. Another interesting dimension of a time-related struggle in this context actually pertains to Palestinian "clock time." Since "extra virgin" olive oil (which depends on the oil's low acidity and is the most desired oil in elite markets worldwide) depends on timely production and shipping, the occupation's general obstructions of movement have also effectively obstructed Palestinians from realizing the market value of their olive oil (Meneley 2008: 21) . The economic aspects of olive cultivation in Israel (but not in the occupied West Bank) are further discussed in the epilogue of Braverman 2009. 
